I. Introduction
The term structure of interest rates plays a critical role in the markets for fixed income securities. A relatively small shift in the shape or level of the term structure may have a large impact on the value of fixed income portfolios. The modelling and estimation of the term structure thus becomes an important research topic for academics and practitioners. Various theoretical and empirical models of the term structure have been proposed and studied in the literature, and many of these models have been developed and/or used by practitioners. However, managers of fixed income portfolios have largely ignored the impact of taxes on the term structure of interest rates and consequently on the value of their portfolios. One reason for this ignorance is that there have been very few empirical studies of tax effects on the term structure and no clear consensus has been reached regarding the importance of tax effects. In this study, we intend to fill this void by conducting an empirical test of tax effects on bond market equilibrium and linking the results to tax reforms and changes in the interest rate environment.
In a perfect bond market, absent of taxes, transaction costs, short-selling restrictions and other market frictions, there exists a set of discount factors that equate all bond prices with the values of their discounted cash flows. A non-segmented equilibrium is said to obtain in such a market since all investors hold positive amounts of all available bonds and every bond is correctly priced. However, when investors are taxed at different rates, after-tax cash flows to investors from the same bond can vary across different tax brackets and these investors may thus have different values for the same bond. As such, clienteles may form in the bond market where one clientele prefers to hold one subset of all available bonds while others prefer to hold different subsets. Equilibrium in such a market is typically characterized by investors specializing in the holding of subsets of available bonds. Such segmentation is, in general, the result of arbitrage opportunities that are prohibited by market frictions such as short-selling restrictions. Pioneering work by Schaefer (1981 Schaefer ( , 1982a Schaefer ( , 1982b laid the foundation for studies on tax effects on bond market equilibrium.
Estimating the term structure of interest rates in markets with taxes requires knowledge of the type of equilibrium that prevails in the bond market. If a non-segmented equilibrium prevails, the standard estimation methodology is appropriate since all bonds are correctly priced for all investors. On the other hand, if a segmented equilibrium prevails, there is no longer a common term structure that is appropriate for every tax clientele. This is because each tax clientele holds a different subset of all available bonds and the term structure becomes tax bracket specific. For each tax bracket, the term structure should be estimated by using the subset of bonds that investors in the bracket actually hold. The term structure estimation may be biased if other bonds are included as well in such cases. As a result of such potential complications, it is important to empirically test for tax effects on bond market equilibrium and the presence of tax clienteles.
The issue of whether equilibrium without tax clientele effects is possible in a bond market has been the subject of a number of theoretical and empirical studies. Schaefer (1982a) was the first to recognize the potential impact of taxes on bond market equilibria. In a market with differential taxation, he showed that arbitrage opportunities may exist for some investors no matter what bond prices turn out to be. The existence of such arbitrage opportunities effectively precludes the attainability of any type of market equilibrium unless all investors end up in the same tax bracket, or unless market frictions such as short-selling restrictions prevent the unlimited exploitation of arbitrage opportunities. Equilibria obtained in this fashion are characterized by clientele effects or market segmentation where investors in each clientele hold a subset of all available bonds. Dammon and Green (1987) extended Schaefer's (1982a) analysis using a state-contingent framework and concluded that non-segmented equilibria may exist under a progressive taxation scheme. Their key insight was that as an investor exploits arbitrage opportunities, his or her income increases and this may move him or her to higher tax brackets. The dynamic nature of the marginal tax bracket means that many apparent arbitrage opportunities are only temporary or limited . A non-segmented equilibrium is still possible when the limited arbitrage opportunities disappear as investors move up to higher tax brackets. Given these studies, it is thus an empirical issue whether tax effects are important and if non-segmented equilibria prevail in the marketplace.
Previous empirical studies have produced conflicting findings on the impact of taxes on bond market equilibrium. Schaefer (1982b) and Ronn (1987) provide evidence in support of tax clienteles and market segmentation in the market for British and U.S. government bonds, respectively. Both studies employ a linear programming methodology. Litzenberger and Rolfo (1984a) apply a linear regression technique and examine the tax effects in the U.S. Treasury bond markets. Their findings are consistent with the absence of tax effects, in contrast to results in other studies discussed earlier. Ehrhardt, Jordan and Prisman (1995) also examine the tax effects in the U.S. Treasury bond market using a regression methodology. Their results, however, support the existence of tax clienteles. Litzenberger and Rolfo (1984b) , Jordan and Jordan (1991) , and Prisman, Roberts and Tian (1996) examine the convexity on triplets of bonds with identical maturity and find evidence in support of tax effects.
A difficulty in these empirical studies is that the identification of clientele effects requires an analysis of deviations of bond prices from the discounted value of the bonds' cash flows. However, bond price data typically contain noise (much larger bid-ask spreads than stock prices), making it difficult to determine whether these deviations are a consequence of statistical error or of clientele effects. A solution to this problem is provided by Katz and Prisman (1997, KP hereafter) , who propose a nonstatistical test to verify if a non-segmented equilibrium (i.e., the absence of clientele effects) is feasible. The KP test focuses on the structure of the after-tax payoffs on all available bonds and determines if a non-segmented equilibrium is feasible in theory. The advantage of their methodology is that it does not require any data on bond prices and consequently its test results are not contaminated by noise in bond price data. Their test results show an ebb-and-flow pattern of feasibility and infeasibility of non-segmented equilibrium in the Canadian government bond market.
Our objective in this study is to empirically test for tax effects in the bond market and provide more concrete evidence regarding the existence of non-segmented equilibria. Previous empirical studies typically apply a single statistical or nonstatistical test and draw conclusions from the test results. In this study, we apply both statistical and nonstatistical tests to examine tax effects in the Canadian bond market and link the test results to changes in the tax code and the interest rate environment. We first apply the KP nonstatistical test to examine the feasibility of non-segmented equilibria or the absence of clientele effects in the bond market. Since actual bond prices are not needed in the KP test, its results are not affected by noise contained in bond prices. The KP test merely shows whether a non-segmented equilibrium is theoretically feasible at all. Even when feasibility is assured by the KP test, such an equilibrium may not actually prevail in the marketplace. Nevertheless, this nonstatistical test provides valuable insight on tax effects and leads naturally to our second empirical test. This is a statistical test based on a multivariate linear regression analysis similar to that used by Litzenberger and Rolfo (1984a) . This regression analysis incorporates smoothing of the term structure of interest rates with cubic splines. Statistical inference is based on the size and sign of the regression intercept. We will argue that a tax effect is detected if the regression intercept is positive and statistically significant. By combining the results from both tests, a more thorough analysis of tax effects is made possible.
To achieve the objectives of this study, we choose to investigate tax effects in the Canadian government bond market. The Canadian tax code pertaining to fixed income securities is simpler than the U.S. counterpart, allowing us to apply both statistical and nonstatistical tests. The KP test cannot be applied to the U.S. bond market because the premium in bond price over par value is amortized against the coupon payments for tax purposes. In addition, there is no distinction between long-term and short-term capital gains in the Canadian tax code. This simpler structure of the Canadian tax code provides near laboratory conditions for this study and makes it possible to use both regression and nonstatistical tests for the feasibility of non-segmented equilibria.
We test for tax effects in the Canadian bond market in the period 1964 through 1986. We choose this particular sample period for a number of reasons. First, short sales, though legally allowed in Canada, are very difficult or too costly to implement during our sample period and thus may constitute the type of frictions that are needed to prevent or reduce arbitrage opportunities. Such market frictions make it possible to reach a segmented equilibrium with tax clientele effects under differential taxation, as argued by Schaefer (1982a) . In Canada, proceeds from short sales are withheld in addition to margin requirement. The cash balance cannot be withdrawn until the short position is closed and it does not earn any or earns negligible interest. This constitutes a sizeable cost to short sales. In today's bond market, the availability of interest rate derivatives and the easing of constraints on short sales make it easier to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities. This may make tax effects harder to detect in a more recent time period.
1 Second, the Canadian government introduced taxation on capital gains income in 1972, midway through our sample period. This shift in tax treatment may alter the existence and nature of tax effects. Studying Canadian tax reforms together with the results from our statistical and nonstatistical tests, we can form hypotheses concerning the timing and prevalence of tax effects. Finally, in the latter half of our sample period (post-1978), we also witness a dramatic rise and then an equally dramatic fall in interest rates in Canada (and elsewhere in the world). Such large shifts in interest rates may lead to significant increases in capital gains and losses. This in turn increases the importance of capital gains tax and may result in stronger tax effects.
We consider four tax brackets in our regression analysis of tax effects. The first tax bracket faces no taxation on either ordinary (coupon) income or on capital gains income. We use two other tax brackets facing zero taxation on capital gains income: one taxed at 20 percent and the other at 50 percent. The fourth and final tax bracket used in this part of our study faces 50 percent taxation on both ordinary and capital gains income.
2 These tax brackets reasonably encompass the majority of Canadian investors and are considered to be the representative subdivisions. The first bracket represents the tax exempt institutions such as pension funds, while the final bracket represents the highest tax bracket in Canada occupied by banks, dealers and other financial institutions.
Before discussing our main findings, it is important to recognize two implicit assumptions underlying the empirical tests we use for this study. First, it is assumed that the exact amounts and dates of all after-tax payments on these bonds are known with certainty. In reality, however, neither the tax rates that will apply in the future nor the exact days on which tax payments will be made are known with certainty. If such uncertainty is incorporated in bond prices in the marketplace, our test results may be biased for or against the null. Nevertheless, major tax reforms are quite rare and tax rates tend to be quite stable over time. For the 23 years in our sample period, only one major tax reform occurred pertaining to fixed income markets, which is the introduction of capital gains tax 1 Strictly speaking, short selling, directly or indirectly through derivatives, is inconsistent with equilibrium.
In a progressive taxation regime described in Schaefer (1982a) , unlimited arbitrage profit is possible if short selling if freely allowed. Equilibrium is only possible if restrictions on short sales are present in the marketplace. Although such restrictions are lessened in recent years, they are still prohibitive to the types of arbitrage activities in our framework. Arbitrage in the bond market may require holding the short position (and the long position) over a long period of time (until maturity). In reality, however, short positions can be held only for a short period of time. In addition, interest rate derivatives are generally not available on individual bonds and thus may not help setting up arbitrage positions required in our framework. Nonetheless, studying an earlier time period ensures a higher chance of detecting tax effects.
2 Taxation on capital gains income was phased in following its introduction. From 1972 to the end of our sample period, the phase in was fifty percent, meaning that only half of capital gains earned were taxable. in 1972. In addition, the assumption that the collection of income and the payment of tax owing on that income be simultaneous is not unreasonable. A rational investor would set aside sufficient funds for the future tax liability whenever income is received, either on a voluntary or involuntary basis. Hence, these assumptions are unlikely seriously to alter inferences based on the test results.
Furthermore, the KP nonstatistical test makes a rather extreme assumption regarding the time proximity of after-tax cash flows in order that they be deemed perfect substitutes. In fact, it is assumed that only payments occurring on exactly the same day are regarded as perfect substitutes. As interest income earned in a couple of days is probably negligible, this extreme assumption is probably unnecessary. In the modern era of clever financial engineering, it is also true that even imperfect substitutes can be made perfect via the addition of a simple swap (at a cost, of course).
3 The effect of making this extreme assumption is to make non-segmented equilibria more feasible, thus making the rejection of the null more difficult. In some sense, the more incomplete the market, the more difficult it will be to rule out a non-segmented equilibrium. This tends to reduce the power of the KP test. However, if the null is actually rejected (i.e., non-segmented equilibrium is infeasible) despite this extreme assumption, the evidence against the null is actually stronger. This is in fact quite close to what we have found in the Canadian bond market. In addition, virtually all bonds in our sample mature either on the first day or the fifteenth day of the month.
4 This means that there are only two days in a calendar month during which a payment is made and those two days are at least fourteen days apart. This Canadian market regularity actually minimizes the potential impact of the KP assumption and allows us to treat all cash flows within fourteen days as perfect substitutes.
Our empirical results show that tax effects are found in the majority of the months in our sample, especially so in the second half of the sample period. We also find that the impact of taxes on bond market equilibria is influenced strongly by changes in the tax code and interest rate environment. Using the KP nonstatistical test, we find that in only fourteen months of the entire 276 month sample is non-segmented equilibria feasible, all occurring in the pre-1977 period. However, such an equilibrium is nearly feasible in many more months, especially in the first half of the sample period. It appears that the infeasibility is induced by only a small number of bonds, less than six percent of outstanding issues on average. A non-segmented equilibrium is actually feasible if these bonds are taken off the market (off the run). In addition, the regression analysis is generally consistent with the KP nonstatistical test. The regression results indicate that tax effects are almost nonexistent in the Canadian government bond market before 1977, but are predominant in the post-1976 months of our sample period. This division of our sample period is tied directly to the introduction of the tax on capital gains in 1972 and the dramatic rise in interest rates between 1976 and 1981 and the equally dramatic fall in interest rates after 1981.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the literature pertaining to the clientele effects and its bearing on the methodology employed in the current paper. The empirical methodology and results are presented in Section III. Conclusions are offered in Section IV.
II. The Feasibility of Non-Segmented Equilibria
Consider a market with n existing bonds involving m payment dates. Let A k denote the n × m matrix of after-tax payments to investors in tax bracket k. Element a k ij in A k is the after-tax payment made by bond i to an individual in tax bracket k on date j (i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , m). A k j is the j th column of A k and P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) , where P i is the price of bond i.
The absence of arbitrage opportunities to investors in tax bracket k necessitates the absence of a vector x of portfolio weights for which x P ≤ 0, x A k j ≥ 0 for all j, and at least one inequality is strict.
( 1) It is well known by Farkas' Lemma that (1) is satisfied if and only if there exists a vector d k of discount factors, referred to as the term structure of discount factors, satisfying
Note that term structure defined this way is actually tax bracket specific and therefore need not be the same across different tax brackets. In markets where (2) is satisfied for all tax brackets, a simple inversion of (2) may lead to an estimate of the term structure of discount factors. However, bond prices typically contain observation errors that can be in the form of bid-ask spread, infrequent trading, and measurement error (tick size). Such observation errors tend to be random and have zero mean in a large sample. Solving (2) using the regression method is more appropriate in this case because random noise is filtered out by the regression analysis and a more accurate estimate of the term structure is obtained. Such a regression can be formulated as follows:
In this regression, d k is constrained to be greater than or equal to zero rather than strictly greater than zero and the monotonicity constraints
Indeed, all published regression studies, including Carlton and Cooper (1976) , Jordan (1984) , Litzenberger and Rolfo (1984) and McCulloch (1971 McCulloch ( , 1975 , report that these constraints are not binding. Our regression results are consistent with these findings. Theoretical studies of tax clientele effects also note the difficulties in satisfying (2) because the intersection ∩
k ≥ 0} may be empty. The right-hand side of (2), the vector of observed bond prices, P , is the same for every tax bracket k. However, the lefthand side of (2), the discounted value of the after-tax cash flows from bonds to an investor in tax bracket k, is tax bracket specific. As such, the difficulty lies in finding a solution to (2), a tax-bracket specific vector of discount factors, d
k , equating the discounted after-tax cash flows to the observed bond prices. Moreover Dermody and Rockafellar (1991) offer a theoretical argument explaining why, if (2) is satisfied, i.e., the above intersection is not empty, a monotonic and strictly positive d k satisfying (2) will exist under mild regularity conditions. What therefore prevents the no-arbitrage condition from being satisfied across tax brackets is the difficulty in satisfying equation (2), or equivalently (6) below, across tax brackets.
Thus empirically, by solving (3) where d ≥ 0 instead of (2) where
is obtained. The satisfaction of equation (4) may be formulated as a linear programming problem (with the convention that the minimum over an empty set is ∞) by introducing a dummy objective function d 0 to get
Applying the duality theory of linear programming, (5) holds if and only if (6) below holds.
Because after-tax cash flows from bonds are tax bracket specific, (6) (or equivalently (4)) may not be satisfied for all tax brackets simultaneously. Investors may not be able to agree on the relative pricing of bonds in this case and arbitrage opportunities exist for at least some tax brackets. Non-segmented equilibria cannot be reached under differential taxation. Market frictions play a critical role in such markets by forcing a segmented equilibrium. Exploitation of the apparent arbitrage opportunities is prevented or limited by market frictions such as transaction costs and short sales restrictions. In particular, the constraint on short sales changes (1) and (2) to (7) and (8), respectively:
for all j, and at least one inequality is strict.
[
Clearly, equation (8) 
In such a market, the term structure, d k , is tax bracket specific.
In order to estimate a tax bracket-specific term structure, it is thus necessary to distinguish between correctly and incorrectly priced bonds for investors in the tax bracket. Estimating d k using all available bonds is incorrect if (2) is not satisfied for bracket k. Only for the correctly priced bonds does the term structure of interest rates equate the discounted value of the cash flows from bonds with their prices. If these bonds are identified and (2) is satisfied exactly for these bonds as in the case where (2) is satisfied for all tax brackets, inversion of (2) might result in an estimate of the term structure of discount factors. However, taking into account observation errors in bond prices, a direct inversion of (2) would impound the random error into the estimated discount factors leading to unknown bias.
Due to the presence of random errors in bond prices, it might be difficult to determine whether the deviation of a bond price from the discounted value of its cash flows is the result of observation error or of a segmented market. This is rather unfortunate as it makes it difficult to identify the correctly priced bonds for a given clientele. It is thus important to search for alternative methods to examine the feasibility of non-segmented equilibria. The KP nonstatistical test is such a solution and is not affected by random errors in bond prices. The essence of the KP test is explained below.
In general, a bond makes one pre-specified payment on a given day in a period. The length of the period depends on the actual market. In most markets a period is six months long and coupons are paid semiannually. Let B u denote the set of bonds that pay a coupon on the u th day of the period u ∈ U = {u | u = 1, 2, . . . , U, such that B u = ∅}, P u denotes the vector of prices of these bonds, and x u is a vector denoting a portfolio of bonds in the set B u . For example, assume that on the first of January, 1980, we consider u * = February first. The set B u * for a market where coupons are paid semiannually includes the outstanding bonds that mature on the first of February and/or of August of all future years. Obviously none of these day-defined sets overlap and, therefore, B u , u ∈ U constitutes a grouping of the full set of existing bonds. For each tax bracket k and for each day, u ∈ U, let A uk denote a matrix for which the [i, j] th element, a uk ij , is the net-of-tax payment by bond i on date j on the two payment months. So for u * , the columns of A u * k are associated with February 1, 1980 , August 1, 1980 , February 1, 1981 , August 1, 1981 , and so on. A uk is a submatrix of A k , consisting of rows that contain bonds in B u and columns in which at least one bond in B u makes a payment.
A careful inspection of (6) reveals that it is a separable problem and that its satisfaction for a tax bracket k is equivalent to satisfying U such conditions, one for every u of the period such that B u is not empty.
The idea can be understood intuitively as follows. Consider two groups of bonds. The first group contains bonds that mature on either January first or July first of all future years, and thus also have all associated coupon payments occurring on these two dates.
The second group contains bonds that mature on either February first or August first of all future years. The bonds in the first group cannot be used to replicate the bonds in the second group, and vice versa. No arbitrage is possible between the two groups. These arguments extend to groups of bonds maturing on March first or September first, on June fifteenth or December fifteenth, and so on to any similarly constructed group of bonds. If arbitrage is not possible within each and every group, no arbitrage is possible overall. By separating bonds into different groups this way, we are making an implicit assumption that payments on different calendar days are not substitutes. However, it is rather extreme to regard cash flows only one day apart to be anything but perfect substitutes. It might be argued that dates within a week are close enough that the cash flows could be considered substitutes. The effect of this less stringent requirement is to increase the number of bonds in each group and hence the likelihood of infeasibility of non-segmented equilibria. In our empirical study, the closest payment dates are fourteen days apart (excepting those bonds noted in footnote 4) due to an empirical regularity in the Canadian government bond market. As a result, bonds in our sample are separated into groups with payments at least fourteen days apart. This empirically derived cash flow substitution seems reasonable.
Formally, if a portfolio x uk yields a non-negative cash flow to an investor in tax bracket k on date j, it must satisfy the condition x uk A uk j ≥ 0. This means that x uk must lie in the upper half space bounded below by the hyperplane x A uk j = 0. Hence, if x uk yields a non-negative cash flow to an investor in tax bracket k on every payment date j, (j = 1, . . . , m), x uk must lie in the intersection of upper half spaces bounded below by all the hyperplanes corresponding to the columns of A uk . The intersection corresponding to each tax bracket k, is a convex cone defined by C uk = x | x A uk ≥ 0 , and one such intersection exists for each tax bracket. Condition (6) requires that all these intersections (for all k) lie in the half space [x u ] P u ≥ 0. Thus, if the union of all the intersections is larger than a half space, then (6a) cannot be satisfied for date u. A key result on this condition is summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem (The KP Condition). Unless two or more bonds in B u mature on the same day, there exists a P > 0 that satis es the no-arbitrage condition for B u .
The proof of the above theorem can be found in Katz and Prisman (1997, Theorem 4.2) . The conditions depend only on the structure of payments from bonds and not on the numerical values of the elements of the payment matrix, A k . This analysis is based on deterministic conditions 5 for the existence of a strictly positive price vector satisfying the no-arbitrage condition across tax brackets. While these conditions make an equilibrium without clientele effects feasible, they do not necessarily mean that such an equilibrium will prevail in the marketplace. The next section tests for evidence of non-segmented equilibria and presence of tax effects.
III. Empirical Methodology and Findings
In this section, we investigate whether or not a non-segmented equilibrium was feasible both in theory and empirically in the Canadian bond market, month by month, during the period from January 1964 through December 1986. This investigation is carried out with reference to the information regarding tax reforms and changes in the interest rate environment during our sample period, documenting the feasibility of non-segmented equilibria in the Canadian bond market. The KP condition is applied first to identify time periods in which a non-segmented equilibrium was feasible. This test is not affected by noise in bond price data and thus the test result does not contain statistical errors. However, even if the structure of the matrix of payoffs from bonds supports a non-segmented equilibrium theoretically, such an equilibrium may not prevail under actual market conditions. A multivariate linear regression technique (with cubic splines) is used to test for market segmentation. The results of the regression analysis are compared to the hypothesized prevalence and timing of tax effects gleaned from the timing of the introduction of capital gains taxation in Canada, the changes in interest rate environment, and from the results of the feasibility test.
IIIa. Data
The Dalhousie Bond Data Base for Government of Canada marketable bonds is used for this study. The data base was compiled from the Bank of Canada Statistical Review and the Bank of Canada Review for the period 1963-1986. 6 It contains monthly bond price observations on the last business day of each month. We exclude from our sample those bonds that contain embedded option features. It is worth mentioning that bond prices contain noise since they are actually average prices between bid and ask quotations provided by investment dealers. The bid-ask spread for these bonds is typically about 20 basis points during our sample period.
IIIb. The Feasibility of Non-Segmented Equilibria
5 By deterministic we mean, if the conditions outlined are satisfied, such a price vector exists, and this statement carries zero probability for either type I or type II errors although the bonds' prices contain random noises.
6 The data in 1963 are incomplete and thus excluded from our sample.
The feasibility of a non-segmented equilibrium for the period 1964-1986 is tested using the KP condition. The first step is to divide the set of all available bonds into groups with matching payment dates. In the spirit of Katz and Prisman (1997) , we make the seemingly extreme assumption that only payments occuring on exactly the same day are considered perfect substitutes. Such an assumption makes the market more incomplete and so will make it more difficult to rule out non-segmented equilibrium. However, this assumption is not so extreme in the Canadian government bond market since virtually all bonds make payments on either the first or fifteenth of the month. Due to this market regularity, our initial assumption is in fact equivalent to treating all cash flows within two weeks as perfect substitutes. We subsequently relax this assumption even further and do not see any material change in our results.
Since bonds in Canada make semiannual coupon payments, it is sufficient to examine payments dates in a six-month period. For each observation month, the set of outstanding bonds is divided into groups, with bonds in each group sharing an identical payment date over the following six calendar months. The KP condition is then applied within each group to verify the no-arbitrage condition. Since bonds mature and new bonds are issued as time goes by, these subdivisions are time dependent. If non-segmented equilibrium is infeasible in a given month, the specific bonds causing this infeasibility are identified. We refer to these bonds as problem bonds . When no problem bonds are found in a given month, non-segmented equilibrium is feasible (at least in theory). Table 1 summarizes the results of the feasibility test based on the KP condition. The focus of the table is the number of problem bonds in each month as we are interested in the feasibility of non-segmented equilibria. In Panel A, summary statistics are provided for the number and percentage of problem bonds in a month. During our 23-year sample period, the minimum number of problem bonds in a month is zero while the maximum is nine (or 15.22 percent of all bonds). In addition, the average number of problem bonds in a month is 2.86 or 5.76 percent of all outstanding bonds. This means that a relatively small number of bond issues need to be removed from the market (commonly known as off the run ) for a non-segmented equilibria to be feasible. Although non-segmented equilibrium is feasible only in fourteen months, it is nearly feasible in many more months.
In Panel B, the distribution of the number of problem bonds is summarized. During our sample period, no problem bonds are found in only fourteen months out of a total of 276 months, or 5.1 percent of the time. This means that non-segmented equilibria are rarely feasible in our sample period. Some form of tax effects may exist throughout the period. However, there are many more months where the number of problem bonds is only three or less. In the 262 months with problem bonds, 180 months have no more than three problem bonds. We may regard these months with non-segmented equilibria nearly feasible, because no more than three bonds need to be taken off the market for non-segmented equilibria to be feasible. In that sense, tax effects, though present over the majority of our sample period, may be fairly weak in most months and only strong in a rather small number of months. Our subsequent regression analysis supports this argument and sheds more light on this issue.
The month by month results on problem bonds, though not reported in Table 1 for brevity, reveal additional insight on the feasibility of non-segmented equilibria. In the fourteen months where non-segmented equilibria are feasible, all are found prior to 1973. This coincides with the introduction of capital gains tax in 1972. These are seven months in 1964, three months in 1965, and four months in 1972. These results are significantly different from those reported in Katz and Prisman (1997) . The reason for this difference is that bonds with embedded options are excluded in our sample, but not in theirs.
As discussed before, one caveat to the KP condition is that only cash flows occurring on the same date are regarded as perfect substitutes. Fortunately, most Canadian government bonds make payments only on the first or the fifteenth day of the month. This Canadian bond market regularity implies that only cash flows more than two weeks apart are not regarded as perfect substitutes when the KP condition is applied. This treatment of cash flow substitution is quite reasonable. Yet, non-segmented equilibrium is feasible in only fourteen out of 276 months. If the requirement for cash flow substitution is weakened further, say all cash flows within a month are regarded as perfect substitutes, we might have found even fewer months where non-segmented equilibrium is feasible. In the 262 months where non-segmented equilibrium was found infeasible, it will remain so if the exact matching assumption is weakened. On the other hand, non-segmented equilibrium may no longer be feasible in the fourteen months where it was found to be feasible. To see if this is the case, we re-examine the KP condition in these fourteen months where non-segmented equilibrium was found feasible. It turns out that even if we allow cash flows within two months to be treated as perfect substitutes, non-segmented equilibrium remains feasible in these fourteen months. Our initial test of the KP condition is thus robust. Consequently, we hypothesize that we will find evidence of tax effects widespread during the sample period, especially after 1972, in the regression analysis that follows.
IIIc. The Attainability of Non-Segmented Equilibria
Next, we apply a multivariate linear regression analysis to further investigate tax effects in Canada. We then compare the results to our hypotheses based on capital gains tax reform in 1972 and the likely prevalence of segmented equilibria gleaned from the KP feasibility test. As mentioned before, the prices given in the Dalhousie data base are not actual prices: they represent averages of quotes from investment dealers. The bid/ask spread for these bonds is typically 20 basis points during our sample period. Thus, these prices may imply arbitrage opportunities and tax effects that cannot be realized in actual trading. Such noise may bias the regression results and the usual reservation applies when the results are analyzed later.
In our regression analysis, four tax brackets are considered, each a combination of the tax rate on ordinary (coupon) income (τ c ) and on capital gains income (τ g ). The first tax bracket faces no taxation on either ordinary (coupon) income or on capital gains income. We use two other tax brackets facing zero taxation on capital gains income: one taxed at 20 percent and the other at 50 percent. The fourth and final tax bracket used in our study faces 50 percent taxation on both ordinary and capital gains income.
7 These tax brackets reasonably encompass the majority of Canadian investors and are considered to be the representative groups. The first bracket represents the tax exempt institutions such as pension funds, while the final bracket represents the highest tax bracket in Canada occupied by banks, dealers and other financial institutions.
Consider a regression for estimating the discount factors,
with an intercept inserted in the equation to facilitate hypothesis testing. The rationale is that if the market is non-segmented, the deviations of [A k ]d k from P are attributable only to noise and testing the hypothesis
should result in accepting the null. If, on the other hand, the market is segmented, then b may be significantly different from zero since for some rows (bonds) [
This deviation may cause the intercept to be positive, Jordan (1984) , and thus the intercept may become significantly different than zero. A non-segmented equilibrium is supported if the null cannot be rejected for any tax bracket. Segmented equilibria or clientele effects are supported if the null is rejected by at least one bracket. Using the Dybvig and Ross (1986) language, we classify segmented equilibria as either the clientele effect in quantities or the clientele effect in both prices and quantities. If the null cannot be rejected by at least one other bracket, all bonds are priced correctly for investors in this bracket. We thus have a segmented equilibrium with a representative investor/bracket. This is known as clientele effects in quantities but not in prices. A stronger form of clientele effect is 7 One may argue that it is difficult to distinguish between investors who are tax exempt (the first bracket) and those who pay the same rate on income as capital gains (the fourth bracket). We argue this is not the case in our study. In Canada, capital gains tax applies to realizations rather than to accruals. The rate of substitution between income and capital gains will not be the same for these two tax brackets. In addition, premium bonds carry capital losses while discount bonds carry capital gains. This may lead to quite different cash flow structures for investors in the two tax brackets. This difference may attract tax-exempt investors toward low-coupon bonds and the taxed investors to high-coupon bonds.
8 Intuitively, if the null hypothesis is rejected, segmented equilibria prevail. However, from a no-arbitrage
Our empirical results confirm that when the null hypothesis is rejected, the intercept is always positive.
supported if the null is rejected by all tax brackets. This is known as clientele effects in both prices and quantities, and no representative investor exists in such a market.
The regression is run on a monthly basis during our sample period. The regression is based on a continuous approximation of d k , the tax bracket-specific term structure of discount factors. To simplify the notation, the superscript k for the tax bracket will be omitted. However, it is understood that d(t 0 , t) is tax bracket specific. The discount function d(t 0 , t) is approximated by a linear combination of cubic splines as 9 in Litzenberger and Rolfo (1984) . The interval [t 0 , T ] is partitioned into k subintervals by placing r + 1 knot points , at t 0 , t 1 , · · ·, and t r = T . The knots are placed such that an approximately equal number of payment dates falls into each subinterval. Over each subinterval, the discount function is a cubic polynomial. At each knot, the discount function and its first and second derivatives are constrained to be continuous such that both the discount function and the implied forward rate function are smooth. Such a discount function is given by the following equation,
where the D i (t)s are step functions at the knot points defined as
for i = 1, 2, · · · , r. Such a discount function is uniquely defined by r + 2 parameters α, β, γ 1 , γ 2 , · · ·, and γ r . The choice of r follows McCulloch (1975) : r is set as the integer closest to the square root of n, the total number of bonds available in the market. Consider a default-free coupon bond with par value F , annual coupon payment C, and m payment dates T 1 , T 2 , · · · , T m remaining. The price of this bond is the discounted value of its after-tax cash flows, given by
Substituting equations (10) and (11) into equation (12), a regression equation is obtained and subsequently used to examine tax effects,
where δ = (C/2)(1 − τ c ), σ = F − τ g (F − P ), α 0 is the regression intercept, and is a random error term. The standard assumptions regarding the regression error term are made. Under the null hypothesis that tax clientele effects are absent, the intercept of the above regression equation, α 0 , is zero.
10
The regression analysis described above is carried out for each month in our sample period and the null hypothesis is tested using the standard Student-t test. The results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 provides evidence on the null hypothesis for each individual tax bracket. It shows the number of months the null is rejected for each bracket. Table 3 aggregates the regression results across tax brackets and provides inference on market equilibrium.
11
We examine the results reported in Table 2 first. In a sample of 276 months, the null hypothesis of zero intercept is rejected at the 5 percent significance level in 110 months (39.9 percent of the time) in the first three brackets and in 59 months (21.4 percent of the time) in the fourth bracket. Consistent with segmented equilibria induced by market frictions depicted in (8), we find the regression intercept to be positive in all cases for which it is statistically significant. Only a handful of negative intercepts is reported (17, 20, 22 and 40 for the four brackets, respectively), but none is found to be statistically significant. A positive intercept is consistent with the presence of tax clienteles since investors hold positive amounts of bonds that are priced correctly for them and none that are overpriced for them. This means that the present value of after-tax cash flows for a given tax bracket is either equal to the bond price or less than the bond price, as indicated by (8). A positive intercept is consistent with this type of clientele effect induced by taxes and other market frictions. Our regression results are consistent with the presence of tax clientele effects.
In addition, the regression intercept term in (9) is artificially inserted to examine clientele effect. This is equivalent to running an unrestricted regression which, by construction, will lead to an average regression residual of zero. However, if we run the regression with the intercept supressed, we expect positive regression residuals if the clientele argument is correct. Four graphs, Figures 3 through 6, are presented showing the average residuals from this restricted regression for each month of the sample period for each of the four tax brackets. These regressions were run without an intercept term. With very few exceptions, the residual term is overwhelmingly positive, consistent with the existence of clientele effects. We also see a dramatic increase in the size of the regression error in the post-1977 period, consistent with the higher clientele effects detected using the unstricted regression 10 Note that the bond price, P , enters both sides of the regression equation if capital gains are taxed. An instrumental variable method was used to obtain consistent estimates of the regression coefficients. For each regressor an instrument is constructed by replacing P with F , i.e. replacing the price with par value. The resulting instrumental variables are not correlated with the error term and are highly correlated with the regressors.
11 Note that Tables 2 and 3 provide summary of our regression results. Details of these results are not reported here for brevity but are available upon request.
analysis.
Some interesting patterns also emerge from the regression analysis. First, the null hypothesis is rejected in exactly the same number of months, 110 months, for the first three tax brackets. An examination of regression results month by month further reveals that the null is rejected in exactly the same 110 months (rather than different 110 months). When the null is rejected by one bracket, it is also rejected by the other two brackets. A possible explanation for this synchronous behaviour is that all three brackets are untaxed in capital gains income. As suggested by the KP condition, the existence of non-segmented equilibria is completely determined by the type of bonds in the marketplace (in other words, the pattern of payments) rather than the specific tax bracket of investors.
Second, there is a clear division of our sample period as evidenced by the null hypothesis. In the first half of the sample period from January 1964 to April 1976 the null hypothesis cannot be rejected by a single bracket in any month. Tax effects, if any, are not statistically significant in this early time period. The second half of the sample period from May 1976 to December 1986 is, in contrast, a completely different story. In a total of 128 months in this later period, the null is rejected by at least one bracket in 110 months or 85.9 percent of the time. This clear change in tax effects in the two subperiods coincides with several important changes in the Canadian government bond market. Further explanation of these changes will be provided subsequently. Table 3 aggregates the regression results across tax brackets and provides inference on market equilibrium. As defined by Dybvig and Ross (1986) , three general types of equilibria are possible in a bond market with taxes and other market frictions: non-segmented equilibrium, segmented equilibrium with clientele effects in quantities but not in prices, and segmented equilibrium with clientele effects in both quantities and prices. We will refer to these equilibria as Types I, II, and III equilibria. In a Type I equilibrium, investors in all brackets hold positive amounts of all available bonds. Bonds are correctly priced for investors in all brackets and no tax effects exist in such a market. These so-called non-segmented equilibria are found in 166 months of our sample period, or 60.1 percent of the time. The majority of these months (81.9 percent) are in the early period before May 1976. The remaining 110 months exhibit segmented equilibria with 51 Type II and 59 Type III equilibria. The strongest tax effects are found in Type III equilibria, where no representative investor/bracket exists and tax effects are found in all brackets. Nearly all Type III equilibria, 54 our of 59 months, are found in the last five years of our sample from January 1982 to December 1986. In addition, in the 51 months where Type II equilibria prevail, the fourth bracket is the only representative bracket. Tax effects are present for all other three brackets. This finding coincides with the fact that the fourth bracket is the only bracket taxed on capital gains income.
Results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that tax effects are nonexistent in the first half of our sample period (prior to May 1976) but show up clearly in the second half of our sample period, especially the final five years. This finding is consistent with the results from the nonstatistical test based on the KP condition. The number of bonds leading to a segmented equilibria is fairly small prior to 1982, averaging around 2.4 bond issues. After 1981, this number jumps to 4.4. With the number of bonds leading to tax effects increasing in the final few years, our regression analysis provides evidence of increased segmentation and clienteles.
These findings can be explained by several important empirical regularities in the Canadian bond market. First, the number of bonds outstanding has increased dramatically over our sample period. In January 1964, there were only 30 bonds outstanding in the Canadian government bond market. By the end of 1986, that number increased to 117, representing a nearly three-fold increase over 23 years. As the number of bonds increases, the bond market is likely to become more complete. This is especially so in the Canadian market because most Canadian government bonds make payments either on the first or the fifteenth day of the month. With more bonds in the more recent time period, it may become more difficult to reach non-segmented equilibria. Figure 1 illustrates the growth in the number of outstanding bonds in Canada during our sample period.
Second, the increasing presence of tax effects is likely to be related to tax reforms that occurred during our sample period. Capital gains tax was introduced in Canada in January 1972, approximately one third into our sample period. Until December 1986, capital gains income was taxed at 50 percent of the tax rate on ordinary income. In other words, half of capital gains income was included in taxable income.
12 With the introduction of capital gains tax, clientele effects are likely to intensify if capital gains or losses are expected on investments in bonds. Our regression results show that tax effects are not detected until May 1976 and are relatively weak (Type II equilibria) until early 1982. This is consistent with interest rate movements in our sample period. As Figure 2 shows, Canadian interest rates remain fairly stable until late 1976 and early 1977. Interest rates rose steadily after that and reached a record high in 1981. During the remaining five years, interest rates fell back as dramatically as they had risen previously and reached the pre-1976 level by the end of our sample period. As a result, capital gains or losses are likely to be prevalent in the latter part of the sample period from 1976 to 1986. This coincides precisely with the increasing presence of tax effects evidenced in our regression analysis.
In addition, institutional investors dominate the Canadian government bond markets during our sample period. These are typically pension funds, insurance companies, trusts and commercial and investment banks. Some of these institutions are tax exempt such as pension funds and fall into our first tax bracket. Other institutions are taxed on both interest and capital gains income and fall into our fourth tax bracket. During the first half of our sample period, the supply of Canadian government bonds was relatively modest and pension funds were likely the marginal investor because they needed these bonds the 12 The capital gains inclusion rate was raised to two-thirds (66.7 percent) in 1988 and then to three quarters (75 percent) in 1990.
most. During the second half of our sample period, however, the Canadian government ran up a considerable deficit and needed to borrow a large sum of funds to finance its budget deficit. The much increased supply in the second half of our sample period is likely to attract other institutions to invest actively in the Canadian government bond market. With investors in diverse tax brackets participating in the bond market, tax effects are much more likely to have an impact on bond prices.
IV. Conclusions
This paper investigates tax effects in the Canadian bond market. Unlike previous studies, we apply both statistical and nonstatistical tests to analyze clientele effects and market equilibria. The nonstatistical test is based on the KP condition first proposed by Katz and Prisman (1997) . The innovation of this test is that it does not rely on market prices. Instead, it examines whether there exists any price vector that would in theory eliminate all arbitrage opportunities to all tax brackets. Our statistical test is modeled after the regression analysis used by Litzenberger and Rolfo (1984a) . The essence of the regression analysis is that segmented equilibria may be induced by differential taxation and other market frictions such as shortselling restrictions, bid-ask spread and trading costs. Inferences are based on the sign and size of the regression intercept. We use four representative tax brackets encompassing all major institutional investors in our sample period from 1964 to 1986.
Results from both statistical and nonstatistical tests show that tax effects are almost non-existent in the Canadian government bond market before 1977, but are predominant in the post-1976 months of our sample period. Non-segmented market equilibria cannot be rejected before 1977, with no tax effects detected in the regression analysis and very small number bonds identified by the KP condition leading to infeasibility of non-segmented equilibria. After 1976, tax effects are increasingly present in the regression analysis, especially after 1981. Non-segmented equilibria are strongly rejected in most months after 1976, especially so from 1982 to 1986. In fact, segmented equilibria with clientele effects in both quantities and prices characterize the final five-year period in our sample. The KP condition also identifies an increasing number of bonds that may lead to segmented equilibria in the second half of our sample period, especially in the final five years.
These findings are consistent with several empirical regularities in the Canadian bond market during our sample period. First, the number of bonds increased dramatically during our sample period, which may lead to a more complete market making it more likely to reach a segmented equilibria. Second, capital gains tax was introduced in Canada in 1972, approximately one third into our sample period. In addition, interest rates rose dramatically in the late 1970s and the first two years in the 1980s and then fell equally fast until the end of our sample period, resulting in large capital gains and losses on bonds. Finally, deficit financing by the Canadian government in the second half of the period dramatically increased the supply of bonds in Canada, attracting more investors from diverse tax brackets to participate in the bond market. All these factors may have, directly or indirectly, played a role in the increased tax effects in the later part of our sample period. , using the KP condition. Panel A reports summary statistics. In the second column, the number of problem bonds refers to the number of bonds in a given month whose removal from the market will make non-segmented equilibria feasible. If there are no problem bonds, non-segmented equilibria are feasible. In the third column, the total number of bonds refers to the number of bonds outstanding at the end of each month in the sample period. In the last column, the percentage of problem bonds refers to the number of problem bonds as a percentage of all outstanding bonds in a given month. Panel B reports the distribution of the number of problem bonds. For each tax bracket, the table reports the statistical significance of the regression intercept term. The absence of tax effect for the tax bracket implies that the regression intercept is zero, which is our null hypothesis to be tested. Rejection of the null means that tax effect is detected and investors in the bracket do not hold positive amount of all available bonds. Each bracket is defined by a combination of the tax rate on ordinary (coupon) income (τ c ) and on capital gains income (τ g ). The first tax bracket is exempt from taxes. The second and third brackets are exempt from capital gains tax but taxed at 20 percent and 50 percent on interest income, respectively. The final bracket is taxed at 50 percent on both ordinary and capital gains income. The regression equation is:
where δ = (C/2)(1 − τ c ), σ = F − τ g (F − P ). This table summarizes the type of market equilibria prevailed in our sample period based on the results of our regression analysis of tax effects in each bracket. We identify three types of market equilibria, using the language of Dybvig and Ross (1986) . Type I equilibrium is known as a non-segmented equilibrium, where tax effects are not found in any bracket. Type II equilibrium refers to a segmented equilibrium with clientele effects in quantities but not in prices. In this type of equilibria, tax effects are found in at least one bracket but not all brackets. Type III equilibrium is also a segmented equilibrium, but with clientele effects in both quantities and prices. In this type of equilibria, tax effects are found in all brackets. No investor holds positive amount of all outstanding bonds in this type of equilibria, representing the strongest clientele effect. 
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Figure 1 Number of Bonds Outstanding by Month
The number of bonds outstanding is plotted during the sample period from 1964 to 1986. As the Canadian government borrowed ever larger amounts for deficit financing, the number of bond issues outstanding increased dramatically in our sample period. 
